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We consider a model of power distribution in a social system where a set of agents plays a simple game on
a graph: The probability of winning each round is proportional to the agent’s current power, and the winner
gets more power as a result. We show that when the agents are distributed on simple one-dimensional and
two-dimensional networks, inequality grows naturally up to a certain stationary value characterized by a clear
division between a higher and a lower class of agents. High class agents are separated by one or several lower
class agents which serve as a geometrical barrier preventing further flow of power between them. Moreover,
we consider the effect of redistributive mechanisms, such as proportional (nonprogressive) taxation. Sufficient
taxation will induce a sharp transition towards a more equal society, and we argue that the critical taxation level
is uniquely determined by the system geometry. Interestingly, we find that the roughness and Shannon entropy
of the power distributions are a very useful complement to the standard measures of inequality, such as the Gini
index and the Lorenz curve.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Inequality of income, wealth, or power is one of the
main social and political concerns [1,2], since it undermines
social welfare, democracy [3], and economic growth [4].
Thus, a correct understanding of the dynamics of inequality
has become one of the main research topics of theoretical
social science and economics. There are different theoretical
approaches in order to explain social inequality [5,6]. On
one hand there are models based on the disparity of human
abilities, which claim that inequality increases are related
to a large extent to the growth in technological complex-
ity, that puts a bigger prize on certain rare skills. On the
other hand there are theoretical approaches based on self-
organization and the intrinsic instability associated with the
accretion of wealth: money begets money. In addition, there
are institutional and political factors, such as taxation or other
governmental policies, which bear a strong influence on social
inequality [1,2,7].
Statistical mechanics can play a significant role in this
endeavor. The interchange of wealth between individuals was
compared to the interchange of energy between the molecules
of a gas which leads to the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution. Yet,
in 1960 Mandelbrot [8] remarked the difficulty of making this
view compatible with one of the main empirical observations
about the distribution of income or wealth, known as Pareto’s
law: The population with income above u falls like u−α for
large enough u. In 1996, Stanley et al. [9] remarked that power
laws were, in fact, ubiquitous in physical systems with long-
range correlations. Moreover, they coined the term econo-
physics, in analogy to biophysics, to describe the application
of statistical mechanical concepts and methods to the study
of the economy [10], with agents playing the role of atoms
[11–14].
These agents can be simple or complex, and in modern
approaches they are even allowed to learn from their ex-
perience [15]. Most analysis in econophysics favors agents
following simple rules, yet showing rich dynamics. In 2000,
Bouchaud and Mézard showed that a simple model with
random speculative trading might be mapped to the well-
known problem of directed polymers [16], showing a rather
sharp transition between a relatively egalitarian and an ex-
tremely unequal phase. The same year, Dra˘gulescu and
Yakovenko [17], and Chakraborti and Chakrabarti [18], used
simple models with conserved wealth and random inter-
changes, with or without savings, to describe different equilib-
rium distributions. These models were found to yield Pareto
distributions in some regimes [19–25]; see [26–28] for re-
views. Some recent models have considered the effect of
personal savings and taxation [29]. Other studies have focused
on the appearance of social classes [30], the extraordinary ve-
locity of growth of the top earners [31], or how inequality may
induce economic crisis without requiring external shocks [32].
Many of these models are built on multiplicative stochastic
processes, for which the approach to equilibrium can be
extremely slow, and the validity of the ergodic hypothesis is
questionable [32–36]. Interestingly, recent work shows that
pooling and sharing of resources (i.e., redistribution) may
increase the growth rate [36,37].
We propose an extremely simple model combining some
features which are already present in the literature: (a) agent
interactions that amplify inequalities: the more you earn, the
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easier it is to earn even more; this active element of wealth
motivates us to call it power; (b) geometric constraints: agents
can only interact with their neighbors; (c) a global redis-
tributive mechanism, which we will call taxation. In addition
we have explored the above features in a graph and have
quantified the wealth inequality using both standard measures
and statistical mechanical concepts which are not usual in the
econophysics context, such as the roughness and the Shannon
entropy. As we will show, our proposed dynamics gives rise
generically to a higher and a lower class of agents, created
through the amplification of initial random fluctuations in
combination with geometrical constraints. The stationary state
is strongly dependent on the early history of the system, and
ergodicity is broken when taxation is absent. Low amounts of
taxation can have subtle counterintuitive consequences. Yet,
high enough tax levels lead to a phase transition towards a
much more equal system, where ergodicity is restored.
Similar phenomena of amplification of random fluctuations
make appearance in other areas. For example, many models
of interfacial dynamics show a higher growth rate at peaks
than at valleys, giving rise to the so-called shadowing insta-
bility [38,39], which explains, e.g., the characteristic flower-
like shapes of bacterial colonies in a medium with limited
nutrients [40,41]. Moreover, fluctuations are also amplified
in Pólya’s urn model [42,43], where we are asked to pick
a ball from an urn and replace it with several balls of the
same color. Interestingly, Pólya’s urn model has found several
applications in social science, e.g., to innovation [44].
We would like to emphasize that our model is built on
two elements which have been widely employed in the sta-
tistical mechanics and the econophysics literature: random
interchanges leading to unequal distributions and a smoothing
mechanism. Our focus, nonetheless, will be on their interac-
tion through a graph and the geometrical constraints imposed
on the growth of inequality. The aim of this work is merely
to present an extremely simple statistical mechanical model
whose merit is to characterize how the amplification of noisy
events can give rise to the creation of a strong class division,
and some efficient ways through which these effects might be
mitigated. We do not put forward any claims regarding actual
social inequality.
The article is organized as follows. Section II discusses the
power game in some detail. The case of two players is exposed
in Sec. III. In Sec. IV we consider a one-dimensional array of
players in detail, combining tools from economics, informa-
tion theory, and kinetic roughening. Other graph structures are
discussed in Sec. V, clarifying the nature of the transition. The
article ends with conclusions and some suggestions for further
work.
II. THE POWER GAME
Let us consider N agents, connected through a certain
graph G. Agent i is endowed with a certain magnitude which
we will call power, wi  0. Total power is normalized to be
one,
N∑
i=1
wi = 1. (1)
The initial distribution of power will always be homogeneous,
i.e., wi = 1/N for all i.
At each round, a randomly selected agent i will propose
a bet to her neighbors within the graph [45]. The agent will
bet a certain fraction of her power, αwi with α < 1, and her
neighbors will be required to call the bet. Neighbor players
whose power is larger than αwi are forced to do so; all
others are discarded. Let Bi be the set of active players,
whose cardinal is mi. A winner is chosen with probability
proportional to their power, i.e., the probability that player
j ∈ Bi will win is
Pj = w jZi , Zi =
∑
k∈Bi
wk . (2)
After a winner is chosen, she earns an extra amount of power
αwi(mi − 1), and all others reduce their power in the amount
αwi. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the basic power game
procedure.
In order to determine a proper time scale, we will define
a time step as a sequence of N rounds of the power game.
During the first time step the homogeneous system develops
random fluctuations, and these fluctuations will grow with
time. In the long run, after a time of order α−1, most agents
will be ruined, possessing negligible power, and a few of
them will concentrate nearly all the power. A clear class
division can be established in our case: Agents who can
call all possible bets by their neighbors are termed powerful,
and correspond to the higher class. Agents who cannot call
some bets will be termed powerless, or lower class. In some
situations, a single agent may accumulate all the power for
long times.
A. Redistribution
In order to diminish the drive towards inequality, we may
introduce a global redistribution mechanism, which we will
call taxation. After each time step, all players will provide
to a central authority an amount τwi of their power, with a
fixed τ < 1 that we will call the tax rate. The total collected
amount, which is equal to τ , is shared equally among them. In
other words,
wi → wi − τwi + τ/N. (3)
Notice that taxation reduces the power possessed by indi-
viduals whose power exceeds the average value 1/N , and
increases the power of the rest. Also, notice that our proposed
taxation mechanism is nonprogressive, since all players must
provide the same fraction of their power. It is interesting to
consider τ−1 to be the time scale required for the redistribution
mechanism to reach an egalitarian state, starting from any
distribution.
B. Measuring inequality
The set of {wi} will be called a profile. We define the width
or roughness of the profile in similarity to the definition in
kinetic roughening [46]:
W 2 =
N∑
i=1
(
wi − 1N
)2
, (4)
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FIG. 1. (Top) Illustration of the power game for a one-
dimensional graph. (First stage) The selected agent is depicted in
red, while the two neighbors appear in green, all others in gray. The
bar under each player indicates her power. (Second stage) Players
separate their bet. (Third stage) A winner has been chosen (player
i + 1), and she receives all three bets. (Bottom) Two profiles for a
system with N = 50 and α = 0.01, for short and long times (t = 1
and t = 1000). Notice that, in the long run, high class agents are
effectively separated by low class ones.
where we subtract 1/N because it is the average power pos-
sessed by all agents. Notice that W 2/N is the variance of the
power.
Another useful measure of inequality is the Shannon en-
tropy of the profile, defined by [47]. Since all powers {wi}
are positive and add up to one, they can be regarded as a
probability distribution and we have
S = −
N∑
i=1
wi logwi. (5)
Notice that Neff = exp(S) can be used as an estimate for the
number of active players. In effect, if we choose an agent k
with probability wk , transmitting our choice will require S
bits, similarly to a choice among Neff equally likely agents.
We will also consider a sorted version of the profile {ωi}
in nonincreasing order: ω1  ω2  · · ·  ωN . In other terms,
ωk is the power possessed by the kth most powerful agent. It
allows us to define the fraction of agents with power larger
than w, ρ(w), through the following relation: ρ(w) = k/N
when ωk = w. Moreover, we will define the Lorenz curve [28]
L(k/N ) as the total power possessed by the poorest k players:
L(k/N ) =
k∑
i=1
ωN−i+1. (6)
The Lorenz curve allows one to define the Gini coefficient [28]
of the distribution as the area between the Lorenz curve and
the perfect equality value, L(x) = x.
G ≡
∫ 1
0
dx(x − L(x)). (7)
It can be shown to correspond to the expected value of
the differences of power of two different players, multiplied
by N ,
G = N
N∑
i, j=1
|wi − w j |. (8)
In order to gather some intuition, let us consider a case
where Nu upper class agents concentrate all the power among
themselves, equally. The width of the distribution can be
found applying Eq. (4),
W 2 = 1
Nu
− 1
N
. (9)
The entropy of the distribution can be found to be S =
log(Nu), expressing the amount of information required to
transmit the identity of an agent selected with a probability
equal to her power. On the other hand, the Gini index can be
found using Eq. (7), and it is
G = 1 − Nu
N
, (10)
i.e., equal to the fraction of lower-class individuals.
III. TWO PLAYERS GAME
Let us consider the case with two players, with powers w1
and w2. With some abuse of notation, let us call wi(t ) the
TABLE I. Payoff matrix for a single round of the power game
between two players.
Gambler Winner Probability Payoff
1 1 12w1 +αw1
1 2 12 (1 − w1) −αw1
2 1 12w1 +α(1 − w1)
2 2 12 (1 − w1) −α(1 − w1)
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TABLE II. Fluctuations in the payoff of player 1.
Gambler Winner Probability (Payoff−E(Payoff))2
1 1 12w1 α
2/4
1 2 12 (1 − w1) α2(4w1 − 1)2/4
2 1 12w1 α
2(4w1 − 3)2/4
2 2 12 (1 − w1) α2/4
expected value for the power of the first player at time t . The
expected amount of the bet is α/2 [αwi(t ) when placed by
player i]. If she wins, she will gain an amount of power ≈ α,
but only with probability wi(t ). Thus, the expected value for
wi(t + 1) is given by
wi(t + 1) = wi(t ) + α
(
wi(t ) − 12
)
. (11)
This equation can be iterated, and we obtain
wi(t ) = 12 +
(
wi(0) − 12
)(1 + α)t . (12)
In other words, the expected value of the power will increase
(decrease) exponentially when the initial value is above (be-
low) 1/2, exp(±γ t ), with γ = log(1 + α).
This approach does not inform us about the fluctuations.
Thus, a more detailed calculation is needed. Table I shows
the payoff matrix for a single power game with two players,
depending on who is the gambler and who is the winner.
The expected gain of player 1 is given by the following
expression:
E (Gain) =
∑
Prob. × Payoff = α
(
w1 − 12
)
, (13)
where the sum is implicitly extended over all possible out-
comes.
In order to obtain the variance of the gain of player 1,
we make use of Table II, where we describe the expected
squared deviations with respect to the expected payoff. Thus,
the variance of the payoff of player 1 is given by
V (Payoff) =
∑
Prob. × (Payoff − E (Payoff))2 = α
2
4
. (14)
Both predictions, Eqs. (13) and (14), are checked against
numerical simulations in Figs. 2(d) and 2(e), for a small
number of rounds (100) and a low value of α = 10−3. The
fit is remarkably accurate.
Interestingly, the collapse of all deviation curves shown in
Fig. 2(e) and predicted in Eq. (14) depends on the precise rules
employed. Appendix discusses a slightly different set of rules
for which this collapse does not take place.
Notice that, in the long run, the system can be in two dif-
ferent absorbing states: One of the players will possess all the
power while the other will be ruined. The probability of ever
visiting the other state becomes negligible as the game length
increases. This implies a breaking of ergodicity [33–36]: The
stationary state of the system depends on its (early) history,
and cannot be properly called an equilibrium state.
IV. ONE-DIMENSIONAL POWER GAME
The power game, as described in Sec. II, is defined on an
arbitrary graph. We will consider in this section the applica-
tion to a number N of players displayed along a ring. For all
cases, we have run 100 simulations and averaged the results,
checking for convergence.
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FIG. 2. (Left) Two-player histogram of w1 using α = 10−3 for different initial values w1(0) = 0.1 (a), 0.3 (b), and 0.5 (c), and 20 games,
using 106 realizations for each case. (d) Average power of player 1 for the different initial conditions, w1(0) = 0.1 up to 0.5 as a function of
the round order. (e) Power deviation for the same cases. Notice the collapse of all curves, as predicted in Eq. (14). Dashed lines are theoretical
predictions, Eq. (13) and (the square root of) (14).
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FIG. 3. (a) Average width of the power distribution of the 1D
power game as a function of time, for different values of N and α. In
all cases, the tax level τ = 0. The time axis is rescaled as αt , while
the width axis is rescaled as NW , in order to highlight the collapse
at saturation. (b) Entropy decrease as a function of time, with the
time axis rescaled as αt , and the entropy rescaled as exp(S)/N ,
because this magnitude corresponds to the fraction of high class
agents. Notice that this fraction comes close to 1/3 in the long run.
A. Without taxes
The average width of the power distribution W , given by
Eq. (4), is shown as a function of time for a different number
of players and values of α in Fig. 3(a). In all cases, the tax level
was set to zero. The time axis is rescaled as αt , while the width
axis is also rescaled as NW . Notice that all curves start at zero
W , reaching a saturation level for long times. The rescaling
allows all curves to have the same saturation, independently
of α and N , and a very similar saturation time. For short
times, W grows as a power law, W ∼ t1/2, in agreement
with Family-Vicsek scaling for kinetic roughening [46] in the
case of random deposition. Yet, before saturation the width
increases much faster. The inset shows that this second stage
of growth is, indeed, exponential, which does not correspond
to Family-Vicsek scaling.
The evolution of the Shannon entropy S, Eq. (5), is shown
in Fig. 3(b). The time axis is again rescaled as αt , while the
entropy is shown as exp(S)/N , in order to make all curves
collapse, for different values of N and α. As it was argued,
exp(S)/N denotes the fraction of upper class agents, which
converges to ≈1/3 for long times.
The inset of Fig. 3(b) shows the time evolution of the Gini
index, with time again scaled as αt . We notice that it evolves
from G = 0 to G ∼ 0.7. In the class division picture, this value
corresponds to the fraction of lower class agents, which should
be close to 2/3.
Thus, our observations are compatible with the conjecture
that, for long times, the system is divided into an upper class,
containing ≈1/3 of the agents, roughly similar in power, and a
lower class, with the rest of the agents. The lower class agents
possess negligible power, and are unable to call the bets placed
by the higher class agents. Thus, the origin of the 1/3 fraction
should be understood in the following way: A stationary state
is reached if each high class agent is surrounded by two lower
class ones which are not neighbors of any other high class
agent. A typical distribution with this property can be built
by alternating one high class and two lower class agents, thus
giving rise to the observed division.
Moreover, two high class agents can never be neighbors in
the stationary state. That situation is unstable: In the long run,
one of them will always grab the power of the other. So, when
we start from a homogeneous state, the mean value of the
separation between high class agents will be two in the long
run. Yet, stationary states are not perfect crystals, and this
separation is sometimes higher or lower. Even more, if we
are allowed to start from an inhomogeneous situation, we can
tune this separation to higher values. For example, an initial
state with all power in the hands of one of the agents will
remain stationary. Thus, we insist that our model is strongly
nonergodic.
We can obtain further insight about the power distribution
by considering the time evolution of the sorted profile: {ωk}, as
shown in Fig. 4(a) for N = 103 and α = 10−3. Not all values
of ωk are shown, only one out of every 10: k = 10m + 1. In
an initial short time regime, the values diverge exponentially
from the initial one, 1/N . But for αt ∼ 1, the maximal prob-
ability ω1 saturates. Even before, many of the lesser agents
have started an extremely fast decay.
In Figs. 4(b) and 4(c) we show the full sorted profile {ωk}.
Figure 4(b) shows these sorted profiles for different times for
the previous system, N = 103 and α = 10−3. Notice that, for
very short times, Nωk ∼ 1, while it grows more and more un-
equal for larger times. The stationary curve has been obtained
with a good approximation for t = 5000, the last curve. For
t = 1 the sorted profile is totally flat. We see that two classes
develop from the beginning, separated by a large step and with
lower internal variance. As time evolves, the top part of the
high class barely change, but a few high class agents fall into
the lower class, as we see from the leftward shift of the class
boundary with time. Figure 4(c) shows the stationary sorted
profiles reached for different values of N and α.
The collapse of the top part of the profiles shows that the
parameter α determines the timescale, while N determines the
length scale. The continuum limit is obtained for α → 0 and
N → ∞.
B. With taxes
Let us determine the effects of redistribution, through
the use of taxes, as shown in Eq. (3). As we will see, a
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FIG. 4. (a) Time evolution of selected values of the sorted profile
{ωk} with k = 10m + 1, using N = 103 and α = 10−3. The time axis
is rescaled as αt . Notice the initial exponential divergence, followed
by saturation around αt ∼ 1. (b) and (c) Full sorted profile as a
function of the index k, with suitably rescaled axes, for different
values of time (b) and different system sizes and values of α in the
stationary state (c).
transition takes place for τ ∼ α, from an unequal distribution
to a homogeneous one, with some unexpected effects in the
intermediate region.
Figure 5 shows the width, entropy, and Gini for a system
with N = 103, α = 10−3, and different taxation levels. In
Fig. 5(a) we can see that the width W grows for short times as
W ∼ t1/2 in all cases. For low taxation levels, τ < 3α, it still
presents the same features of the no-taxation case, with the
accelerated growth of the inequality near saturation, and the
saturation levels reached are similar. But above that threshold
value, the behavior changes drastically, with the saturation
level falling sharply after a small increase in the taxation level.
Figure 5(b) provides further information about this tran-
sition. We see the time evolution of the effective number of
players, or size of the high class, estimated from the entropy,
Eq. (5). Indeed, for τ < 3α this number decays steadily down
to a value of order N/3. Yet, for τ  3α, the effective number
of players does not seem to decay, even in the long run.
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FIG. 5. (a) Average width of the 1D power game with taxes,
using N = 103 and α = 10−3. The gray line stands for a t1/2 growth.
(b) Time evolution of the entropy and Gini index of the distribu-
tions. (c) Stationary values of the number of effective players, Gini
index, and roughness for the same systems as a function of the tax
level τ/α.
Thus, we conjecture that the system is not divided into classes
anymore. The Gini index, depicted in the inset of Fig. 5(b),
shows the same behavior: It grows steadily to a value close to
0.7 for τ < 3α, and remains close to zero for τ  3α.
Yet, a careful analysis of Figs. 5(a) and 5(b) holds a sur-
prise more. Indeed, the long term Neff is not a monotonously
increasing function of τ : For τ = α it takes a larger value than
for τ = 2α, although just marginally so. This effect is checked
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taxation levels. The time axis is rescaled as αt . (d) Stationary values
of the sorted profiles for different taxation levels.
carefully in Fig. 5(c), where the stationary (long term) values
of the three previous observables (width W , entropy S, and
Gini G) are plotted as a function of the taxation level τ/α.
Interestingly, we observe in all three the same trend: A low
taxation brings about a mild decrease in inequality. Yet, in-
creasing the taxation level from τ = α/2 to τ = 2α increases
the inequality a tiny amount. If we increase the taxation level
further, inequality disappears sharply. The reason seems to be
that mild levels of taxation may have a counterintuitive effect
on inequality: By providing enough power to the worse-off
agents, the high class agents are not effectively isolated and
can still compete among themselves. Yet, we must stress that
this slight uptake in the inequality rate as taxes grow is not
a robust trait of the model, as we have not been able to
reproduce it in higher dimensional lattices (see Sec. V).
Figures 6(a)–6(c) show the time evolution of selected val-
ues of ωk , for k = 10m + 1. Notice that for τ = α, Fig. 6(a),
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FIG. 7. (a) Lorenz curves for the 1D power game with different
levels of taxation, using N = 103 and α = 10−3. (b) Probability of
finding an agent with power larger than w, as a function of w, for the
same systems.
the evolution is very similar to the case without taxes. For
τ = 2α, Fig. 6(b), the time axis seems to be stretched, but
inequality builds up anyway. For τ = 3α, Fig. 6(c), on the
other hand, the system is basically egalitarian, with a negli-
gible spread.
Figure 6(d) shows the stationary sorted profiles {ωk} for
different taxation levels. For τ = 3α the profile is basically
flat, but we can see that the situation can be involved for other
taxation levels.
Within the economics literature, two curves present special
relevance: L(i/N ), the Lorenz curve, defined in Eq. (6) and
the wealth function ρ(w), defined as the probability of finding
an agent with power larger than w. The interest of these
functions, which are not usual in the physics literature, is
highlighted in Fig. 7. In Fig. 7(a) we see the Lorenz curve for
the aforementioned cases. Notice that the diagonal line corre-
sponds to the case of perfect equality, while the area between
the curve and the diagonal line is the Gini index. We notice
that for very low taxation level the Lorenz curve is barely
different from the no-taxation one, while for larger values the
system changes drastically in a short span of taxation levels.
The ρ(w) function is shown in Fig. 7(b) for the same
systems. We also see the strong difference achieved through
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a very small change in the taxation level for τ ∼ α. For τ =
3α the wealth distribution ρ(w) has a sharp decline around
w = 1/N , showing a basically egalitarian system. Yet, for
τ ∼ α the curve becomes more involved, with several steps,
reflecting the complex behavior of the stationary distribution
for low taxation levels.
It is relevant to ask whether these results are robust under
the presence of noise. We have performed numerical exper-
iments with noisy tax rates, i.e., the tax rate for each agent
becomes a random variable, uncorrelated both in space and in
time. Instead of a fixed value τ , the tax rate for each player
at each time step becomes τi = τ (1 + Dη), where D  0 is
a parameter and η is a uniform variate in [−1, 1]. The results
(not shown) are virtually identical even for values of D ∼ 1/2.
Indeed, the average value of the taxation level seems to be the
only relevant variable.
V. THE POWER GAME BEYOND 1D
It is relevant to ask about the statistical behavior of the
power distribution when the agents interact through a more
complex network. In this section we will consider 1D and
2D networks with interactions beyond nearest neighbors.
Concretely, we will consider 1D rings with N agents, and
interaction range r = 1, 2 or 3, and periodic 2D square lattices
with Lx × Ly = N agents with interaction range r = 1 (nearest
neighbors) and r = 2 (nearest and next-nearest neighbors).
Figure 8 shows the long-term stationary state of a power
game played on a 30 × 30 lattice with periodic boundary
conditions and range r = 1, with α = 0.01 and no taxes. The
colorbox is scaled as Nw, where w is the power of each
agent, so that Nw = 1 correspond to the initial equitative
0
2
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10
12
FIG. 8. Power profile in the steady state for a power game played
on a 30 × 30 square lattice with periodic boundaries. The color index
is Nw, where w is the power of each agent, implying that Nw = 1
corresponds to the initial equitative level. Notice that no high-class
agent is neighbor to another one, but otherwise the arrangement is
disordered.
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FIG. 9. (a) Evolution of the expected value of the fraction of
effective players, exp(S)/N , as a function of rescaled time Kαt ,
where K is the number of players for each round. Notice that, in the
long run, the stationary fraction is always 1/K . (b) Expected value of
the fraction of effective players as a function of τ/(Kα) for different
topologies. Notice the rather sharp increase for τ ∼ Kα, denoting
the phase transition from an unequal to an egalitarian system. 1D
systems operate with N = 1000, 2D systems with Lx × Ly = 30 ×
30, so N = 900.
distribution. Players are still divided into two classes, and two
high class players cannot be together along a horizontal or
vertical line in the stationary state. Yet, the configuration does
not appear to present any type of long-range order. Remark-
ably, despite the apparent lack of a local order parameter,
the number of high class players is one-fifth of the total
population, with a rather good precision.
Figure 9(a) shows the expected value of the ratio of effec-
tive players, exp(S)/N , as a function of rescaled time: Kαt ,
where K is the number of players in each round, i.e., the
coordination number plus one. In the present 2D case, K =
5. We have plotted this average for several topologies: 1D
systems with range 1, 2, and 3 interactions, and 2D systems
with range 1 and 2 (next-nearest neighbors, so K = 9). In all
cases, the number of effective players collapses in the short
run, while its long-time behavior changes in a straightforward
way: The ratio of effective players tends to 1/K .
The short-time collapse of exp(S)/N in Fig. 9(a) suggests
that the relevant timescale for the development of inequality
in the power game is 1/(Kα). Figure 9(b) provides evidence
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to support this claim, by plotting the expected value of the
long-term fraction of high class agents, exp(S)/N , as a func-
tion of the ratio τ/(Kα) for the different system topologies
explored in this section. Notice that the transition takes place
for τ/(Kα) ∼ 1, i.e., when the timescale needed to build
inequality and the timescale needed to redistribute roughly
coincide.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
In this article we have researched a random nonstrategic
power game which may describe some features associated
with the accretion of wealth and power in social systems.
Even though the elements on which the game is based are well
known in the literature (random exchanges leading to inequal-
ity and smoothing mechanisms), the extreme simplicity of the
model makes it especially interesting and suitable for analysis
in econophysics and in statistical mechanics.
The resource distributed among the agents is called power
instead of wealth to emphasize its active character: obtaining
power makes an agent more likely to obtaining even more
power. In other words, the probability of winning each round
is proportional to the current power in possession of each
agent. Thus, small fluctuations are naturally enhanced, leading
to a morphological instability. At later stages, the agents can
be divided into classes: a high class, which can call all bets
placed by other agents, and a lower class, which cannot.
Moreover, the system presents broken ergodicity: There are
many possible stationary states, and an arbitrarily long waiting
time is required to jump from one to another.
Importantly, the game is local: Each agent can only play
with her immediate neighbors. Thus, no two high class players
can be neighbors in the stationary state, since one of them
would ruin the other in the long run. When the players are
arranged around a ring, the dynamics leads to stationary
states where the number of effective players is, on average,
one-third of the total number of agents. For other topolo-
gies, we found evidence that the final ratio of low-to-high
class players corresponds to the number of players in each
neighborhood K .
Starting from an equal distribution of power, early-time dy-
namics is described by Family-Vicsek scaling corresponding
to random deposition. Yet, for longer times, the width of the
interface grows exponentially, thus abandoning the Family-
Vicsek paradigm. Shadowing instabilities typically lead to
diffusion limited aggregation (DLA) behavior [38–40], which
seems to be absent from our case.
The introduction of a redistribution mechanism can revert
this trend to the growth of inequality, but only if the taxation
level is high enough. We can consider this effect in terms
of a competition between time scales: τ−1 being the time
scale in which redistribution acts and (Kα)−1, the time scale
associated with the natural growth of inequality. According to
our numerical analysis, τ > Kα leads to an egalitarian society,
with restored ergodicity, while τ < Kα leads to a sharp class
division. This result is reminiscent of Piketty’s claim that
inequality will grow when the rate of return of capital r is
larger than the rate of growth g of the whole economy, since
r−1 and g−1 can be thought of as the time scales associated
with capital and economic growth [2,32,48].
The above behaviors have been analyzed by using different
measures for the inequality of power, such as the roughness
of the profile, the Shannon entropy (which leads to a natural
estimate to the number of effective players), and the Gini
coefficient, always leading to similar conclusions.
Several elements have been left out in this first analysis
of the power game. The first one is the characterization of
the observed transition between a class society and an egali-
tarian society. A second one is the analysis of more realistic
social network structures. In our 1D and 2D examples, we
obtain evidence of a well-known fact: Inequality grows with
globalization. In a fragmented world, an agent can become
the richest of a fixed domain, while in a fully connected
world the same agent can become the wealthiest of the whole
system. It is relevant to ask how our observations will change
for strongly inhomogeneous lattices, more similar to human
societies, such as scale-free and small-world networks.
Another interesting element to be considered in future
work is the inclusion of progressive taxation, in which each
player i would contribute a magnitude proportional to wβi ,
leading to progressive taxation for β > 1 and regressive for
β < 1, which will present a richer phase diagram. The role
of economic initiative also leads to interesting questions: In
principle, it is always against the interests of low-class players
to place a bet. Thus, low-class players will only play either
under coercion or under incomplete information. Coercion
can be modulated through inequality itself: Powerful agents
may be able to force the acceptance of the bet. Yet, the role
of incomplete information is specially intriguing, since it has
been empirically found that a large fraction of respondents
have incorrect beliefs about the inequality levels of their own
country [49]. All these possibilities are worth exploring in
future work.
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APPENDIX: ALTERNATIVE SET OF RULES
FOR THE TWO-PLAYER POWER GAME
As a check, we have considered an alternative version of
the power game, in which the bet is fixed to α/2 instead
of being proportional to the power of the gambler. Table III
shows the payoff matrix in this case for two players.
TABLE III. Alternate power game, with a fixed bet.
Gambler Winner Probability Payoff
1 1 12w1 +α/2
1 2 12 (1 − w1) −α/2
2 1 12w1 +α/2
2 2 12 (1 − w1) −α/2
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FIG. 10. Alternate power game, with fixed bet α/2. (Left) Two-player histogram of w1(t ) using α = 10−3 for different initial values
w1(0) = 0.1 (a), 0.3 (b), and 0.5 (c) and 20 games, using 106 realizations for each case. (d) Average power of player 1 for the different initial
conditions, w1(0) = 0.1 up to 0.5 as a function of the round order. (e) Power deviation for the same cases. Dashed lines constitute theoretical
predictions, Eq. (A1) and (the square root of) (A2).
Please notice that, in this variant of the game, the choice
of the gambler is irrelevant, since the bet will always be the
same. We can estimate in this case the expected payoff and its
variance, as we did in the standard power game, obtaining the
following result:
E (Payoff) = α(w1 − 12 ), (A1)
V (Payoff) = α2w1(1 − w1). (A2)
We observe that the expected gain coincides with the
standard game, but the deviation is proportional to the ini-
tial value of the power of player 1. Figure 10 shows the
histograms, expected power, and deviation of the power of
player 1, similarly to Fig. 2. One can see that the histogram
only contains delta peaks, since the amounts of power of
player 1 can only be given by w1(t ) = w1(0) + mα, where
m ∈ Z.
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